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Urban Security and Counterterrorism: An Approach to
Proportionality
Abstract
As cities and crowded areas increasingly become targets of terrorist plots and attacks,
there is ample demand for risk assessment tools that consider proportional measures that
reduce the threat, vulnerability, and possible impacts, whilst providing ‘security returns’ for
those investments. There is a risk in this process of over- or under-fortifying places based
on practitioners’ subjective biases, experiences, dead reckoning and conflicting agendas.
Currently, risk assessments rely on qualitative tools that do not consider proportionality
that removes these inherent biases. Critiquing well-known urban design strategies and
national risk assessments, this article therefore seeks to develop a supplementary
assessment tool – an equation for proportionality – that is more objective and is created to
help practitioners make good choices, in particular on: (1) reducing the threat, (2)
vulnerability, (3) impact, (4) accepting risk, and (5) measuring a security measure’s ability
to deter, delay or stop an attack. It concludes that while no assessment is truly objective,
the equation works to remove as much subjectivity as possible when assessing proportional
urban security.
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Introduction
European countries have witnessed numerous terrorist attacks over the
past two decades, including vehicle explosions and ramming, and
firearm and knife attacks. Vehicle ramming caused a considerable
number of casualties in the 2010s alone.1 These took place in crowded
vulnerable urban places that were attractive for violent political actors
and included bridges, shopping streets, markets, and promenades. As
recently as 2020, deliberate vehicle ramming by right-wing extremists
during the Black Lives Matter protests has kept the threat in the
spotlight.2 The Taliban’s renewed stronghold in Afghanistan means that
there is considerable uncertainty about what this means for domestic
security in the West and the wider world. The costs of implementing
physical urban interventions—barrier systems, traffic calming measures,
or Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Measures (HVM)—in cities runs into the
billions.
Over the years, local authorities in cities have incorporated “resilience
thinking” into urban planning, where the dynamics and complexities of
urban systems require consideration into the efficiency, spatial factors
and the effects on people who use these spaces. Negotiating the tradeoffs between security and freedom often requires complex political and
negotiation processes between a plethora of different actors with
sometimes mismatched agendas, including the emergency services,
urban planners, architects, local authorities, business owners and
security professionals. Local authorities often must decipher the
complex needs of different end-users of different urban spaces whilst
maximizing security and safety in a proportional and holistic way. While
national risk assessments help in understanding threats, vulnerability,
and potential impact, no study, thus far, has attempted to provide an
objective approach to proportionality that eliminates inherent biases,
intuitions, and experiences that goes into securing vulnerable urban
spaces.
Bias and intuitions can contaminate both the risk assessment process
and measuring cost-effectiveness. The risk assessment maker and the
risk assessment user are both biased.3 Bias is largely cognitive, swayed
by terrorist risk discourses, positivist and subjective approaches to risk,4
case selection bias of security measures,5 hindsight bias,6 practitioner
experience, exposure to certain information of various quality, and even
political affiliation. Bias can be influenced by the often-limited resources
and finances available to secure urban spaces, as well as the
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environmental, historical, or cultural conditions relevant to the urban
space, which may consider both hard (overt measures with open
surveillance) or soft measures (more people-centric and livable green
spaces, for example). This may be further compounded when working in
multidisciplinary groups with varying skills, expertise, responsibilities,
and agendas. The time context is also important: A risk assessor may
draw different conclusions if the threat is moderate, against one working
more rapidly in response to an emerging, highly likely threat. Overall,
this can result in over- or under-estimating the threat, vulnerability,
impact, and the effectiveness of the countermeasures.
The goal with this article is to put forward a supplementary framework,
one that ties today’s assessments of security risk in urban areas to urban
design strategies and thus completes or complements the process.
Proportionality is the objective for achieving these ends, and it focuses
on HVM measures as an example. This article first situates the concept
of proportionality with the security in depth concept and situational
crime and situational terrorism prevention strategies, arguing that these
approaches do not explicitly consider proportionality in urban
counterterrorism strategies. A similar argument is attached to
Norwegian, European, and American risk assessments. It then attempts
to translate proportionality into the urban counterterrorism context.7
Since proportionality is a measure of correspondence, it is a fair
assumption that it can be illustrated as a weight scale or, even more
applicably, as an equation. On one side, there is the apparent security
risk; on the other, there are the security measures and their ability—or
their performance—to help manage the risk.

Proportionality, Security in Depth, and Situational Crime /
Terrorist Prevention
Proportionality is a concept used in many different contexts to exercise
judgement of what measures are most appropriate for a given situation;
from law (what punishment is appropriate to the crime committed) to
the security of vulnerable urban spaces. A proportionality assessment
seeks to strike a balance between the over-fortification and underfortification of a vulnerable urban space. The consequences of the former
might act as a deterrent but may conjure bunker-like feelings of a place,
while the latter may mean the area remains an attractive terrorist target
and make users feel exposed. Questions might therefore arise about
whether, for example, overt security measures could provide
reassurance, or whether security measures should be hidden or covert.
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Ultimately, these considerations introduce subjective biases into the risk
assessment process.
Target hardening also considers the principle of Defense-in-Depth that
similarly disregards objective assessment of proportionality. Defense-inDepth is a multi-layered security mechanism, strategy, theory, and
principle, which has been used for centuries. Its foundations are based
on the premise that a succession of barriers, either physical or technical,
will have to be overcome in order for the offender’s goal to be achieved,
and if one security mechanism fails, another security mechanism will
provide security to protect the asset: A succession of barriers will not
only deny or delay access to the target (a vulnerable urban space, for
example), it may allow time for those protecting the target to detect,
react and respond to the issue.8 Hence, the performance of security
measures is an important aspect in the negotiation between over and
under-fortification, but could suffer the same problem of bias and
inconsistent agendas between different actors invested in the security of
vulnerable urban spaces.
Situational crime prevention (SCP) or situational terrorism prevention
efforts rarely consider proportionality in an objective, non-biased way.
When considering all facets of deterrence, detection, delay and response,
proportional measures are only considered to increase the effort for the
terrorist to attack vulnerable urban spaces (and thus deter them), to
increase the risk to the offender (of failing or getting caught), and,
ultimately, reduce the rewards (impact, shock, and political attention)
that violent political actors typically want to achieve. These assessments
can be mostly based on intuition and dead reckoning, and not the same
degree of objectivity as risk assessments allow.
In summary, proportionality is deeply contextual and is not considered
explicitly in these processes; it relies on a range of different actors
assessing the vulnerability (the gaps and weaknesses) of a space and the
impact (people, assets, societal, economic) it might have based on their
own subjective biases. There will inevitably be consequences, but the
question is what consequences are more acceptable and proportional to
the situation? There is also the issue of being prohibited by costs:
Practitioners are prohibited by space, time, and money, and this
influences certain biases when assessing what solutions are most
appropriate. Securing urban spaces is also influenced by cost-effective
perspectives of multifunctionality: Will a concrete bench provide more
return to users of urban spaces than a bollard system, for example?
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Overall, these conflicts of interests are necessary, but contaminate the
process of deciding what proportionate security is.
One final aspect of proportionality is the utilization of risk assessments
and how they influence the decision-making process. The next sections
provide a brief perspective, and thereafter the article provides an
equation of proportionality that could supplement existing risk
assessment guides and approaches.

Risk Assessments: A Brief Country-by-Country Perspective
Security risk assessments are complex procedures, and different
countries offer different evaluations depending on their strategies and
security culture. On the international level, there are a few risk
assessments that contribute to a universal language and therefore should
be mentioned. These include the Integrated Security and Resilience
framework, Disaster Risk Reduction, the European Union project
Designing Safer Urban Spaces (DESURBS), and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) 400-series guidance manuals against
potential terrorist attacks in the United States.9
At a national level, there are pyramidic structures with the more generic
assessment contents on top—like the international frameworks—and an
increasing level of detail lower down. To understand the process, the
Norwegian framework is worthy of investigation. The Norwegian
Standard no. 5832 Societal Security—Protection Against Intentional
Undesirable Actions is Norway’s official framework for assessing
security risk.10 It describes a linear process that takes users through the
identification of threats, vulnerability assessment, risk determination,
identification of ways to reduce risk, and prioritization of security
measures. Since it is a standard risk assessment, it remains on an
arbitrary level and, as a result, the assessors must fill in necessary
context and required specifics. To help them do so, there are two
additional national frameworks: First is the Supervision Guide for Risk
Assessments in Norwegian Municipalities by the Directorate of Civil
Protection.11 Second is the Guidance for Managing Security Risk by the
National Security Authority.12 Combined, these three documents account
for the Norwegian security risk assessment framework.
None of the listed national and international guides and frameworks
address proportionality explicitly or provide a method for dealing with
proportionality. The most useful, perhaps, is the FEMA 400-series’
security ambition and the DESURBS’ Decision Support System Portal
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tool, although the latter does not distinguish sufficiently between safety
and security risk. However, the existing frameworks are still helpful for
mapping the assessors’ habits and means. Additionally, they provide a
set of qualitative scales to build upon. As an abstraction, any asset can be
scored 0–5 based on its vulnerability to a specific threat. From there on,
assessors can determine the apparent security risk and prioritize
resources.
However, this way of assessing security risk has two shortcomings that
are similarly found in situational crime/terrorism prevention and
Defense-in-Depth: First, it is reliant on the interpretation and rational
thinking of the people taking part in the assessment, meaning that two
assessments with the exact same conditions may show different results.
Second, it fails to address proportionality. As a result of these two
interrelated shortcomings, there is a risk that the security measures
considered will not correspond to the threats. There will always be many
imagined threats with high potential consequences in a city center and
assessors will often apply a one to one response to manage them without
considering vulnerable urban spaces and city centers holistically.13
What is forgotten is that such responses leave out urban design
strategies that aim to deter and delay the threat from happening in the
first place. As a result, it can be argued that the shortcomings go hand in
hand with unproportionate security measures. Due to a thin arsenal of
tools, practitioners are left to trust their gut feelings derived from related
experience or unqualified guesses.14 The question now is how to
strengthen the assessment and create a supplementary framework that
allows assessors to successfully secure our cities without sacrificing
urban livability.

Urban Design Strategies—Towards an Equation of
Proportionality
There are several urban design strategies that help secure urban areas in
the form of HVM measures and some of them are known to provide
better results than others in accordance with the known threats and
resultant vulnerabilities.15 These strategies function alongside or
supplement the previously mentioned frameworks and supervision
guides. Two of the more well-known strategies are Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design and SCP. Of note is Elliot’s Planning for
Protection, later altered by Harre-Young et al. into A New Philosophy
for Urban Security.16 Elliot introduced a set of criteria for securing the
74
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built environment against blast effects. These design criteria were then
adapted into five generic principles that could be applied to any urban
environment. The reworked principles are:
•
•
•
•
•

Deflect a terrorist attack by showing that the chance of success is
reduced.
Disguise valuable parts of a site or a building.
Disperse potential targets to reduce the impact of an attack.
Stop an attack from reaching its target.
Blunt the impacts of an attack should it reach its target(s).

These kind of broader design principles provide appropriate and
informed guidance towards best practices on securing urban areas. But
how this is performed is the next issue.

An Equation for Proportionality
The goal with this section is to put forward a supplementary framework:
One that ties today’s assessment of security risk in urban areas to urban
design strategies and thus completes it. Proportionality is the key for
achieving these ends. It should first be translated into the urban security
context. Since it is a measure of correspondence, it is a fair assumption
that it can be assessed as an equation. On one side, there is the security
risk. On the other, there are the security measures and their ability—or
their performance—to help manage the risk. This results in the following
equation for proportionality P1:
(𝑃1)

𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦

This is where a balanced equation is equivalent to a proportional level of
urban security. This is, however, a simplification of the truth. There are a
few more parameters that need to be part of the assessment. For
instance, holistic security, cost and consequences, urban design
strategies and people’s perception of security—should be understood as a
bare minimum.17 As a result, it should expand each side of the equation
with a set of conditions. On the left side (security risk), there is the urban
area’s vulnerability to a specific threat (A) and society’s security
ambition (S). On the right side (security), there is the sum of the
proposed security measures’ performance to the specific threat
(∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑀𝑃𝑖 ). This leads to the complete equation for proportionality:
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𝑛

(𝑃1)

𝐴 − 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑖
𝑖=1

The left side of the equation details how much needs to be done. The
next step is to give the equation adequate input (numbers). One way of
doing so is to adapt the qualitative scales where values can be scored 0–5
by their degree of presence as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Conversion Table for Qualitative Scales based on Degree of
Presence
None

Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

0

1

2

3

4

5

Source: Authors
An Urban Area’s Vulnerability to a Specific Threat (A)
To assess an urban area’s vulnerability to a specific threat, a set of
subordinate abilities are introduced. The abilities are extracted from
terrorist targeting preferences and thus informs whether an urban area
is considered attractive for an attack.18 By cross-examining a set of
studies, it concludes with five abilities for the A:
•

•

•

•

•

Asset value is a measure of the threat’s possible impact on an
urban area’s assets. Typical parameters are damage, mortality
rates or physical and economic impact.
Availability is a measure of an urban area’s accessibility in the
context of attackers’ means of attack and capability. An available
site is one that fits either the opportunities or the incentive for the
attack.
Compliance is a measure of the urban area and its contents match
with the attackers’ motive. For example, a mosque is likely a
desirable target for right-wing terrorists wanting to achieve
fatalities and media impact.
Fragility is a measure of additional consequences that occurs
when the attack takes place. Falling glass from nearby facades or
the lack of possible evacuation routes are two example conditions
that are likely to make an urban area fragile.
Suitability is a measure of the current security control’s ability to
stop the attack from reaching its desired assets. If there are
already (overt) security measures in place, the urban area is likely
to be less attractive in the eyes of the attackers since it will
increase the required effort.
76
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With the abilities listed, it expresses the A as follows:
Calculating the A
5

𝐴 = ∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖
𝑖=1

A is calculated by scoring each ability 0–5 according to their degrees of
presence, and then adding them together, giving a score between zero
and 25.
Security Ambition (S)
The security ambition (S) is defined as society’s accepted level of an
apparent security risk.19 It is another way of expressing risk acceptance.
In this context, society is represented by the assessors, such as
preparedness planners in a municipality, police, and other first
responders, as well as a variety of stakeholders. It is unrealistic to expect
to eliminate all security risk; often a certain amount of risk must be
accepted. What an assessor can do, however, is define a threshold for
how much risk is acceptable and how much can be managed.
This threshold is key for proportionality, as without it, there is a
potential for overdoing security. To help define the threshold, it is
necessary to look at it from a new perspective, for instance, regarding the
security ambition (S) as a chosen, or at least accepted, level of
vulnerability.20 This way it can be assessed bottom-up by looking at the
A abilities. Although the purpose of the S is to help us sustain a livable
urban environment while securing urban areas, it entails great
responsibility and challenges ethics by adding price tags to lives.
Therefore, it is appropriate to avoid assessing it on a subordinate ability
level by using a set of intervals that are adaptable to the A abilities. Since
the A is limited to a total of 25, dividing the S into a similar framework is
appropriate (as was done for the qualitative scales). This is depicted in
Table 2.
Table 2: Conversion Table for the S
None

Very
low

Low

Medium

High

Very
high

0
0

1-5
5

6-10
10

11-15
15

16-20
20

21-25
25

Interval
Suggested
value

Source: Authors
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Where the assessors decide on which category they are aiming for as
their security ambition, it is suggested to use the higher end of the
intervals. Subtracting the chosen S value from the urban area’s A allows
one to solve the left side of the P1 equation.
Security Measures’ Performance (MP)
From the A and the S, the assessor has a measure for how much they
need their security measures to perform, but they will also need a way of
determining the security measures’ performance (MP) in the P1 equation.
However, there is one important difference: While an urban area’s
vulnerability A and the assessor’s security ambition S are singular, there
might be more than one security measure addressing a specific threat. As
a result, the MP value must be assessed as a sum of n number of
measures. This will help practitioners consider urban security in a
holistic manner.
The MP is built on five abilities. This makes it comparable to the A and S
and allows the use of the same qualitative scales for scoring them. The
abilities constitute a sum, and even though there is no upper limit for
how many urban security measures that can be applied, it sustains itself
by the A upper limit of 25.
The five MP abilities are rooted in urban design strategies and are the
same as listed earlier. Their descriptions are, however, slightly extended:
•

•

•

•

Deflect is the security measure’s ability to show potential
attackers that their attack is unlikely to be successful due to
layout, defenses in place or present security. Deflection goes hand
in hand with overt security measures and is the counterpart of an
urban area’s availability.
Disguise is the security measure’s ability to mislead attackers so
that they fail to achieve their desired consequences. Covert
security measures are key.
Disperse is the security measure’s ability to spread out the assets
they seek to protect. It is a way of controlling an urban area’s asset
value.
Stop is the security measure’s ability to stop an attack from
reaching its desired target or destination. It is the counterpart of
suitability. Key for a high degree of stopping ability is to assess the

78
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 3

•

security measures through a holistic lens and to see to that they
are in cooperation with each other and are preferably layer based.
Blunt is the security measure’s ability to reduce the consequences
of an attack once it has happened. It is the counterpart of fragility
and is best dealt with by building in resilience into the urban
environment.

The MP abilities are a mix of target hardening and environmental
changes that affect the incentives of attacks. The idea is that all proposed
security measures are scored 0–5 and then their sum is used in the P1
equation. It is important to assess the measures interdependently
because they often affect each other’s performance. The MP can be
addressed accordingly:
Calculating the MP
𝑛

∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑖 = 𝑀𝑃1 + 𝑀𝑃2 + ⋯ 𝑀𝑃𝑛
𝑖=1

An Example
The following example is a crowded public square. It can be accessed by
vehicles passing point X and Y. The example covers a walkthrough of the
P1 equation as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A Crowded Public Square

Source: Authors
The area’s vulnerability to vehicle ramming attacks (A):
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•
•

•

•
•

Asset value is very high (5). It is a crowded public square.
Availability is high (4). The square can be accessed by vehicles from
two directions, both with sufficient acceleration distance to achieve
lethal velocity.
Compliance is very high (5). Clusters of people are ideal targets
when wanting to cause the most harm possible using a car as a
weapon.
Fragility is low (1). There are few conditions present that add to the
consequences of a vehicle ramming attack.
Suitability is moderate (3). There are no current security measures
mitigating vehicle ramming, but a two-way traffic pattern in the
inner perimeter could minimize acceleration and hence the
opportunity.

As a result, the area’s vulnerability to vehicle ramming is:
5

𝐴 = ∑ 𝐴𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 5 + 4 + 5 + 1 + 3 = 18
𝑖=1

Next is the security ambition (S). For the sake of the example, it is set to
10 (low):
𝑛

(𝑃1)

18 − 10 = ∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑖
𝑖=1

The final part of the assessment is to check whether a set of retractable
bollards in point X (𝑛1 ) and reinforced square furniture in point Y (𝑛2 ) are
proportional.
The security measures’ performance (MP):
•

•

•
•

Deflect is low (2) for the retractable bollards (𝑛1 ) and none (0) for
the reinforced square furniture (𝑛2 ). The bollards communicate to
potential attackers that the square is protected, but they have no
effect on access point Y.
Disguise is none (0) for the 𝑛1 and low (2) for the 𝑛2 . Reinforced
furniture is a covert measure and is thus able to disrupt or surprise
attackers.
Disperse is none (0) for both measures.
Stop is moderate (3) for the 𝑛1 and none (0) for the 𝑛2 . Retractable
bollards have a chance of malfunction as well as tailgating.
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•

Blunt is none (0) for the 𝑛1 and low (1) for the 𝑛2 . The reinforced
furniture can split crowds during an evacuation towards point Y.

This gives the following MP:
𝑛

2

∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑖 = ∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑖 = (2 + 0 + 0 + 3 + 0) + (0 + 2 + 0 + 0 + 1) = 5 + 3 = 8
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

Which makes it possible to solve the P1 equation:
𝑛

(𝑃1)

𝐴 − 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑀𝑃𝑖

⇒

18 − 10 = 8

⇒

8=8

𝑖=1

The equation is balanced, and the proposed measures are proportional.

Discussion
Before the P1 equation can be used, there are a few topics that must be
elaborated on. Especially relevant are the equation’s objectivity,
limitations, and utility. The equation is a result of methodological trial
and error and while the abilities are rooted in existing literature in the
field, they are, at least in some degree, cherry-picked. The equation can
expand to incorporate other variables but with the risk of becoming
over-complex and not user-friendly. Further testing, research, and
scrutiny is required.
Regarding limitations, the equation does not consider urban security
cost-consequentiality. For example, which consequences would a
disruptive urban intervention, like pedestrianization, have on specific
users of that location, like delivery drivers or the elderly or disabled? It is
therefore important to also compare the security measures’ performance
with their requirements. It is encouraged to consider at least the security
measures’ competence in use, implications for everyday life, life cycle
cost, monitoring and maintenance, as well as the space they seize in an
already developed urban environment.21
The requirement abilities can also be scored 0–5 based on their degree
of presence. However, this comparison should only see that
requirements do not exceed performance. Furthermore, actions will
always have consequences and installing security measures in urban
areas is no exception. The security measures will affect the urban area
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and its surrounding—positively, negatively, or both—and consequences
should therefore also be part of the comparison. As a result, it is
encouraged to consider the security measures’ positive consequences
along with their performance, and their negative consequences along
with their requirements.
Even though it is more difficult to score the consequences, discussing
them will paint a picture of which direction they weigh. Finally, there is a
limitation in regards of complexity. Since the A is limited to the total of
25, the P1 equation might be difficult to use in complex urban areas like
large city squares. This can, however, be dealt with by scaling up both
sides of the equation equally. The FEMA 400-series can be used as a
comparison. It uses a 0–10 range that might be better fitted for larger
and more complex vulnerable urban spaces on the premise that security
risk increases accordingly to the area’s size, content, and overall
complexity.
In terms of utility, the P1 equation presupposes two things: Effective
interdisciplinary cooperation as well as adaption of something new and
untraditional. Additionally, it creates additional work for the assessors
and requires knowledge for using it properly. In some (smaller)
municipalities, this might be an unrealistic requirement.
A final note is that the P1 equation is brand new. It requires testing and
improving, and there are currently no factual results to highlight.
Similarly, whilst this article has focused on HVM, its application to other
attack methods requires further analysis. The equation is thus limited
when it comes to scenario depth: The extent at which the security layers
can prevent, mitigate, and help responses to, a broad spectrum of risks
and threats. For example, one security layer may be effective against a
specific attack method (vehicle ramming), but less effective for other
probabilities. The consequence is that it may require investing in more
security systems to cover a broader spectrum of risks that current
systems are incapable of allaying. But fundamentally, the equation could
supplement existing risk assessments, and could also be adapted to
assess different threats and urban interventions.

Conclusion
As a result of cities and crowded areas increasingly becoming targets of
terrorist plots and attacks, there is ample demand for risk assessment
tools that consider proportional measures that reduce the threat,
82
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vulnerability, and possible impacts, while providing security returns for
those investments. Traditional urban design strategies and qualitative
risk assessments, while useful, still present the risk of over- or underfortifying places based on practitioner’s own subjective biases,
experiences, dead reckoning and conflicting agendas. This could lead to
disproportionate measures that negatively impact urban areas. This
article offers a supplementary assessment tool—an equation for
proportionality— that is more objective and that is created to help
practitioners make better choices on reducing the threat, vulnerability,
impact, and measuring risk acceptance and the performance of security
measures.
While no assessment is truly free of subjective biases, the P1 equation
supplements the existing framework for assessing urban security. It
helps measure vulnerability and the performance of security measures
according to well-known urban design strategies. As a result,
practitioners can check for correspondence between vulnerability and
security, which allows them to secure our cities and urban areas
proportionally.
While using the P1 equation, its limitations and utility need to be
carefully considered. There is more to proportionality than what the
equation takes as input, such as security measures’ requirements for use
and the consequences of installing them into the vulnerable urban
spaces. It is essential that assessors also consider this before they
determine proportionality. As a conclusion, the equation only works—
and should therefore only be used—in a supplementary capacity and be
kept open for improvements. It does, however, in both theory and in
practice, provide the only available means by which proportionality can
be measured, giving users the ability to weigh often complex and
interdependent variables in a more objective, conceptual way.
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